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ABSTRACT
We present an associative recognition experiment comparing
three samples of healthy people (young people, older people
with high cognitive reserve [HCR], and older people with low
cognitive reserve [LCR], with each sample consisting of 40 people),
manipulating stimuli repetition during the study phase. The results
show signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the three samples in their
overall performance. However, these diﬀerences are not due to a
diﬀerent use of familiarity, but rather due to a diﬀerent way of
using recollection: although there are no diﬀerences in the hit
rates between the HRC and LRC samples, the LCR group makes
signiﬁcantly more recollective false alarms than the HCR group.
Moreover, repetition provokes an increase in the recollective false
alarms in the LCR group, but this does not occur in the group of
young people or in the HCR group. These ﬁndings are explained in
terms of recollection-based monitoring errors and seem to provide
support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis.
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Introduction
The main objective of our study is, using an associative recognition paradigm, to analyze
whether the cognitive reserve level of healthy older people aﬀects their rates of false
recollections (i.e., false alarms [FAs] of recollective type, which also called phantom
recollections; Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001), and how this is aﬀected by
the repetition of the pairs of stimuli to be studied.
It is well known that age and cognitive impairment lead to a decrease in the
performance on diﬀerent cognitive functions, especially memory. However, not all
types of memory decline with age in the same way. For example, there is a broad
consensus in the literature that the so-called explicit or episodic memory deteriorates
considerably, whereas the implicit or semantic memory seems to decline less or even
remain intact (e.g., Dew & Giovanello, 2010; Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998; Light & Singh,
1987). Similarly, the so-called dual-process recognition models (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002)
postulate that two processes intervene in recognition: recollection, which is conceived
of as a conscious process involving a threshold-type qualitative retrieval of episodic
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traces and tends to decline with age; and familiarity, which is considered an automatic
retrieval process based on the quantitative estimation of the strength of the memory
trace and tends to remain intact with age. In contrast to the dual models, the single-
process or global strength theories (e.g., Dunn, 2004) propose that information retrieval
from the memory is based only on a quantitative estimation of the trace strength: what
dual models call familiarity would refer to weak memories, while recollection would refer
to strong memories.
In addition, there are clear individual diﬀerences in the way this cognitive decline
appears. For example, the cognitive reserve hypothesis (Stern, 2009) establishes that
lifelong experiences, including educational and occupational achievement and leisure
activities in later life, are associated with a slower rate of memory decline in normal
aging and a reduced risk of developing dementia. People with high cognitive reserve
(HCR) may somehow be able to compensate for cognitive decline by implementing
cognitive strategies or, at a more functional level, by using more complex neural
connections. Thereby, this hypothesis proposes that healthy older people with HCR
would make better use of their cognitive strategies to delay cognitive decline than
older people with low cognitive reserve (LCR). If this is true, in a recognition experiment,
it would be expected, for example, that both samples diﬀer in the use of recall-to-reject
strategy to reduce their FA rates (Rotello & Heit, 2000) which involve rejecting a non-
presented item because one can consciously recollect the presentation of its instantiat-
ing target (e.g., Gallo, Sullivan, Daﬀner, Schacter, & Budson, 2004).
There is also a large body of research showing that false recognition (and false
memories) increases with age in healthy people (e.g., Abe et al., 2011; Dodson, Bawa,
& Slotnick, 2007; Hildebrandt, Haldenwanger, & Eling, 2009; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel,
& Balota, 2009; Norman & Schacter, 1997). Associative recognition is an optimal para-
digm for studying false recognition in older people (Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007), because
it has been established that aging causes more impairment in recognition memory for
associations than for components (e.g., Boywitt, Kuhlmann, & Meiser, 2012; Kilb & Naveh-
Benjamin, 2011; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008; Rhodes, Castel, & Jacoby, 2008). In this
regard, the associative-binding deﬁcit hypothesis (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008) proposes
that older adults’ episodic memory impairments are partially due to a reduced ability to
encode and retrieve associated/bound units of information (e.g., Buchler, Faunce, Light,
Gottfredson, & Reder, 2011; Fandakova, Shing, & Lindenberger, 2013). In a recent study
by our laboratory using an associative recognition task (Pitarque, Sales, Meléndez, &
Algarabel, 2015), we found that repetition increased false recollections in older people,
but not in younger people. This result was interpreted as indicating that young people
(but not elderly people) were able to recollect the original associate of one of the items
in order to reject the rearranged lures, using repetition to improve this recall-to-reject
monitoring strategy (Rotello & Heit, 2000). However, elderly people responded to rear-
ranged pairs mainly based on the high activation (increased by repetition) of each item,
which led them to commit false recollections (Gallo et al., 2004). If this explanation is
correct, and based on the cognitive reserve hypothesis, healthy older people with HCR
would be expected to use their monitoring strategies to reduce their rates of false
recollections through practice better than older people with LCR. Given the theoretical
relevance of the cognitive reserve hypothesis (Stern, 2009), and that there are experi-
mental inconsistencies related to it (see, e.g., Angel, Fay, Bouazzaoui, Baudouin, &
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Isingrini, 2010, or Valenzuela & Sachdev, 2006, supporting it, but Zahodne et al., 2011,
refuting it), we now propose to analyze whether this expected pattern of results is
maintained when comparing a sample of LCR older people and a sample of HCR older
people, or whether the HCR group behaves like the group of young people (i.e., no
increase in false recollections due to repetitions), which would support the cognitive
reserve hypothesis.
More speciﬁcally, we propose an associative recognition experiment (recognition of
faces associated with everyday scenery, with remember–know [RK] judgments; e.g., Kilb
& Naveh-Benjamin, 2011, exp. 2) in which half of the pairs are repeated during the study
task, which allows us to analyze whether older people with HCR make fewer false
recollections than older people with LCR. A control group of healthy young people is
also included to serve as a baseline for comparing the recognition of the samples of
older people with HCR and LCR. With regard to true recognition, we hypothesize that
the three samples diﬀer in their overall performance by their diﬀerent use of recollec-
tion, but not familiarity, as the so-called dual-process recognition models postulate (e.g.,
Yonelinas, 2002). With regard to false recognition, and according to the cognitive reserve
hypothesis, we hypothesize that older people with HCR should use repetition better
than the people with LCR to improve their recall-to-reject monitoring strategy to reduce
their rates of false recollections.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 40 young adults (undergraduates at the University of Valencia; 13 men,
27 women, mean age = 22.05 years, SD = 2.97, range 18–29 years old) and 80 older
adults (recruited from various senior citizen centers in the city of Valencia; 22 men, 58
women, mean age = 68.31 years, SD = 6.96, range 60–90 years old). All participants
reported being in good physical and mental health. In this regard, the mean on the Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE) for the older adults was 28.86 (SD = 1.19), showing no
memory impairment.
The HCR and LCR older groups were created based on the individual cognitive
reserve score for each older participant established according to the guidelines recom-
mended in previous studies (e.g., Solé-Padullés et al., 2009; Stern et al., 2005). Individual
performance was measured on three variables (see Table 1): (a) the WAIS vocabulary
scale (range 1–19); (b) education level (1 = illiteracy; no formal studies, 2 = primary
studies, 3 = secondary studies, 4 = university studies) plus occupation (1 = non-qualiﬁed
manual, 2 = qualiﬁed manual, 3 = qualiﬁed non-manual or technician, 4 = professional;
university degree required, 5 = manager or director; university degree required), yielding
a composite score ranging from 2 to 9; and (c) leisure activities (reading, writing, sports,
daily walking, social activities, etc.), ranging from 0 to 14. Then, a principal component
factor analysis was conducted on these three measures, and a single-factor solution
explained 72.3% of the variance. The ﬁnal individual cognitive reserve score (range:
6.60–25.50) was obtained by multiplying each original individual variable by its factor
loading (e.g., Solé-Padullés et al., 2009). Based on this continuous variable, and to draw
comparisons with young adults, we formed two groups of healthy older people, LCR and
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HCR (matched for gender and age), dichotomizing from the median (=17.15): the
cognitive reserve mean of the LCR group (n = 40) was 12.61 (SD = 2.88), whereas the
mean of the HCR group (n = 40) was 20.52 (SD = 2.04).
Materials
The same materials were used as in Pitarque et al. (2015, pictures pairs). They consisted
of 64 ID-card sized color photographs (145 × 160 pixels) of anonymous faces (16 of older
men, 16 of older women, 16 of young men, and 16 of young women) and 64 color
photographs of unknown everyday scenery (800 × 600 pixels; e.g., Kilb & Naveh-
Benjamin, 2011). With these photographs, we then created four diﬀerent lists of 64
pairs of photographs each, putting a randomly chosen face in the center of a randomly
chosen scene. These four lists of images were counter-balanced between subjects, and
later analyses of the hits and FAs conﬁrmed that there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between them.
Procedure
The associative recognition task consisted of a study phase with 64 pairs of stimuli and a
recognition task with 60 pairs, with a 5-minute break between them. In the study phase,
60 pairs of stimuli (plus 2 pairs of distractors at the beginning and at the end, not tested
later to avoid primacy and recency eﬀects) were presented randomly at the center of a
computer screen for 2.5 seconds each (with a 1-second interval between them).
Participants were instructed to pay attention to the two pictures in each pair. In the
study task, 20 pairs were presented once (later making up the non-repeated intact and
non-repeated rearranged recognition conditions), and 20 pairs were presented twice
(later making up the repeated intact and the repeated rearranged recognition conditions).
In the recognition phase (self-paced), 60 pairs of stimuli were presented randomly at
the center of a computer screen. The participants had to decide whether or not the two
pictures in each pair had appeared together in the study task, choosing one of these
four response options: (a) yes, because I remember some details; (b) yes, because I know
they went together, but not the details; (c) no, both stimuli appeared before, but they
are rearranged; (d) no, neither stimulus appeared before; they are new. That is, partici-
pants only had to respond “yes” to intact pairs, as commonly occurs in associative
recognition experiments. Of the 60 pairs of stimuli presented on the recognition task,
Table 1. Means (and SE) of the participant characteristics.
A. YOUNG
(n = 40)
B. HCR OLDER
(n = 40)
C. LCR OLDER
(n = 40)
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences
(p < .05)
Gender (men/women) 13/27 12/28 10/30
Age 22.05 (0.47) 67.00 (0.78) 69.63 (1.32) A < (B = C)
Mini-Mental (MMSE) 29.25 (0.13) 28.48 (0.22) B > C
Cognitive reserve: 20.52 (0.32) 12.61 (0.46) B > C
WAIS vocabulary 9.03 (0.41) 12.50 (0.34) 10.23 (0.31) B > (A = C)
Education level (scale 1–4) 4.00 (0.00) 3.58 (0.10) 2.03 (0.14) A > B > C
Occupation level (scale 1–5) 3.53 (0.15) 1.53 (0.13) B > C
Leisure activities (scale 0–14) 8.95 (0.28) 4.78 (0.42) B > C
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10 corresponded to the non-repeated intact condition, 10 corresponded to the repeated
intact condition, 10 corresponded to the non-repeated rearranged condition (randomly
re-matching the stimuli in a diﬀerent order from the one studied), 10 corresponded to
the repeated rearranged condition (randomly re-matching the stimuli in a diﬀerent
order), and 20 corresponded to the new condition. Prior to performing the ﬁrst recogni-
tion task, and following strict RK instructions (Koen & Yonelinas, 2014), the diﬀerences
between “remembering” and “knowing” were explained to participants (see Kilb &
Naveh-Benjamin, 2011, exp. 2), emphasizing that a remember response should only be
given if they could communicate a retrieved detail to the experimenter if asked, whereas
a know response should be given if they believed the pair had previously been studied,
but they were unable to retrieve any speciﬁc details. A practice recognition task was
performed to make sure all the subjects understood the instructions.
Results
General recognition performance (total “yes” judgments)
With regard to discriminability data (d’; see Table 2), a mixed ANOVA of 3 groups × 2
repetition conditions1 showed that the main eﬀects of both variables were signiﬁcant,
groups (F2, 117 = 69.40, p <.0001, η
2
p = .54) and repetition conditions (F1, 117 = 17.96,
p < .0001, η2p = .13), indicating that repeated stimuli led to better discrimination than
non-repeated stimuli (means = 2.00 and 1.45, respectively). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests
comparing the means of the three groups showed as signiﬁcant (p < .05) all the
diﬀerences between them (means = 2.71, 1.61, and 0.86, for the young, HCR, and LCR
groups, respectively), indicating that young people performed better than the HCR
group, and the latter, in turn, performed better than LCR group. The interaction between
the two variables was also signiﬁcant (F2, 117 = 5.86, p < .01, η
2
p = .09). Regarding the
analysis of this signiﬁcant interaction (Table 2), post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests showed that
the discriminability improved with repetition in both the young and HCR groups (young
group’s means: 2.21 and 3.20 for non-repeated and repeated conditions, respectively,
t39 = 4.22, p < .0001; HCR group’s means: 1.26 and 1.96, respectively, t39 = 2.94, p < .01),
but not in the LCR group (means: 0.88 and 0.83 for non-repeated and repeated condi-
tions, respectively), which seems to provide support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis.
With regard to hits (see Table 2), a mixed ANOVA of 3 groups × 2 repetition
conditions showed that the main eﬀects of both variables were signiﬁcant, groups
(F2, 117 = 7.76, p = .001, η
2
p = .12) and repetition conditions (F1, 117 = 69.70, p < .0001,
η2p = .37), indicating that repeated stimuli led to more hits than non-repeated stimuli
(means = 0.83 and 0.66, respectively), as would be expected. Post-hoc Bonferroni
t-tests comparing the means of the three groups showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the mean of the young group (0.82) and the means of the HCR and LCR
groups (0.70 and 0.71, respectively, with the diﬀerence not being signiﬁcant). The
interaction between the two variables was not signiﬁcant.
Regarding FAs (see Table 2), a mixed ANOVA of 3 groups × 3 repetition conditions
(non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs) showed that the main eﬀects of both variables
were signiﬁcant, groups (F2, 117 = 57.18, p < .0001, η
2
p = .49) and repetition conditions
(F2, 234 = 108.45, p < .0001, η
2
p = .48). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing the means
AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 629
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of the three groups showed that all the diﬀerences between them were signiﬁcant (0.08,
0.17, and 0.35, for the young, HCR, and LCR groups, respectively). Post-hoc Bonferroni
t-tests comparing the means of the three repetition conditions showed that all the
diﬀerences were signiﬁcant (0.24, 0.29, and 0.06, for non-repeated, repeated, and new
pairs, respectively). Finally, the interaction between the two variables was also signiﬁcant
(F4, 234 = 13.04, p < .0001, η
2
p = .18). Regarding the analysis of this signiﬁcant interaction
(Table 2), simple eﬀects analysis showed that repetition conditions (non-repeated,
repeated, and new pairs) aﬀected the three groups (F2, 78 = 16.29, p < .0001,
η2p = .30; F2, 78 = 32.24, p < .0001, η
2
p = .45; F2, 78 = 68.76, p < .0001, η
2
p = .64, for
the young, HCR, and LCR groups, respectively). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing
the means of the three repetition conditions in each group (Table 2) showed that in the
LCR group, all the diﬀerences were signiﬁcant (means: 0.38, 0.52, and 0.14 for non-
repeated, repeated, and new pairs, respectively), indicating that repeated pairs gave rise
to more FAs than non-repeated pairs. However, in the HCR group, the diﬀerence
between non-repeated and repeated conditions was not signiﬁcant (means: 0.21, 0.25,
and 0.03 for non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs, respectively), as also occurred in the
young group (means: 0.13, 0.10, and 0.00, respectively), that is, repetition increased FAs
in the LCR group, but not in the HCR and young groups. Repetition has been shown to
increase FAs to rearranged lures in older adults in a number of other studies (e.g.,
Fandakova et al., 2013; Gallo et al., 2004; Light, Patterson, Chung, & Healy, 2004; Pitarque
Table 2. Means (and SE) of hits, false alarms, and discriminability index (d’) on the associative
recognition task as a function of groups and repetition conditions (Non-rep: non-repeated pairs; Rep:
repeated pairs; New: new pairs) .
TOTAL “YES” JUDGMENTS
YOUNG (n = 40) HCR OLDER (n = 40) LCR OLDER (n = 40)
HITS Non rep 0.75 (0.03) 0.59 (0.03) 0.65 (0.03)
Rep 0.90 (0.03) 0.82 (0.03) 0.76 (0.03)
FALSE ALARMS Non rep 0.13 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.38 (0.03)
Rep 0.10 (0.03) 0.25 (0.03) 0.52 (0.03)
New 0.00 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
Discriminability (d’) Non rep 2.21 (0.15) 1.26 (0.15) 0.88 (0.15)
Rep 3.20 (0.16) 1.96 (0.16) 0.83 (0.16)
REMEMBER JUDGMENTS
YOUNG (n = 40) HCR OLDER (n = 40) LCR OLDER (n = 40)
HITS Non rep 0.59 (0.04) 0.38 (0.04) 0.45 (0.04)
Rep 0.81 (0.04) 0.63 (0.04) 0.59 (0.04)
FALSE ALARMS Non rep 0.04 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.23 (0.02)
Rep 0.05 (0.03) 0.11 (0.03) 0.39 (0.03)
New 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
Discriminability (d’) Non rep 2.27 (0.17) 1.07 (0.17) 0.79 (0.17)
Rep 3.01 (0.17) 1.96 (0.17) 0.68 (0.17)
KNOW JUDGMENTS
YOUNG (n = 40) HCR OLDER (n = 40) LCR OLDER (n = 40)
HITS Non rep 0.16 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.20 (0.03)
Rep 0.09 (0.03) 0.19 (0.03) 0.17 (0.03)
FALSE ALARMS Non rep 0.09 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.15 (0.02)
Rep 0.05 (0.02) 0.14 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02)
New 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
Discriminability (d’) Non rep 0.25 (0.15) 0.52 (0.15) 0.11 (0.15)
Rep 0.17 (0.14) 0.18 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14)
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et al., 2015; Rhodes et al., 2008). We will later analyze whether this increase in the LCR
group is due to false recollections or familiarity.
Overall, the results show signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the three samples in their
performance, but the HCR group discriminated better than the LCR group because they
committed fewer FA than the LCR group (with similar hit rates in both samples).
Moreover, the learning capacity through practice is preserved in the older HCR group
(using it to reduce their FAs), just as in the young people, but it is seriously limited in the
older LCR group.
Remember judgments
With regard to discriminability data (d’) on remember (R) judgments (Table 2), an
ANOVA of 3 groups × 2 repetition conditions showed similar results to those found for
the d’ of total “yes” responses; that is, the main eﬀect of the variable “groups” was
signiﬁcant (F2, 117 = 53.67, p < .0001, η
2
p = .48). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing
the means of the three groups showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the three groups
(means = 2.67, 1.52, and 0.74, for the young, HCR, and LCR groups, respectively). The
main eﬀect of repetition conditions was also signiﬁcant (F1, 117 = 20.42, p < .0001,
η2p = .15), indicating that repeated stimuli yielded better discrimination through R
judgments than non-repeated stimuli (means = 1.91 and 1.38, respectively), and the
interaction between these two variables was also signiﬁcant (F2, 77 = 7.55, p = .001,
η2p = .11). Regarding the analysis of this signiﬁcant interaction (Table 2), post-hoc
Bonferroni t-tests showed that both the young group and the HCR group improved
their performance on R judgments with repetition (young group’s means: 2.27 and
3.01, for non-repeated and repeated pairs, respectively, t39 = 3.72, p = .001; HCR
group’s means: 1.07 and 1.96, respectively, t39 = 3.90, p < .0001), but the LCR group
did not (means: 0.79 and 0.68, for non-repeated and repeated pairs, respectively).
The mixed 3 × 2 ANOVA of hits on R judgments (Table 2) also showed a similar
pattern of results to what was found for total hits; that is, the main eﬀects of both
variables were signiﬁcant, groups (F2, 117 = 10.36, p < .0001, η
2
p = .15) and repetition
conditions (F1, 117 = 99.21, p < .0001, η
2
p = .46), but their interaction was not, indicating
again that repeated stimuli gave rise to more hits on R judgments (mean = 0.68) than
non-repeated stimuli (mean = 0.48). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing the means of
the three groups showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the mean of the young group
(0.70) and the means of the HCR and LCR groups (0.51 and 0.52, respectively, with the
diﬀerence not being signiﬁcant), indicating that both older samples might show an
associative-binding deﬁcit (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008).
Finally, regarding FA on R judgments (see Table 2), a mixed ANOVA of 3 groups ×
3 repetition conditions (non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs) showed that the
main eﬀects of both variables were signiﬁcant, groups (F2, 117 = 39.37, p < .0001,
η2p = .40) and repetition conditions (F2, 234 = 68.92, p < .0001, η
2
p = .37). Post-hoc
Bonferroni t-tests comparing the means of the three groups showed signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the mean of the LCR group (0.23) and the means of the HCR
and young groups (0.08 and 0.03, respectively, with the diﬀerence not being sig-
niﬁcant). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing the means of the three repetition
conditions showed that all the diﬀerences were signiﬁcant (0.12, 0.18, and 0.03, for
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non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs, respectively). Finally, the interaction between
the two variables was also signiﬁcant (F4, 234 = 18.86, p < .0001, η
2
p = .24). Regarding
the analysis of this signiﬁcant interaction (Table 2), simple eﬀects analysis showed
that repetition conditions (non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs) aﬀected all the
three groups (F2, 78 = 8.85, p < .0001, η
2
p = .19; F2, 78 = 13.54, p < .0001, η
2
p = .26; F2,
78 = 51.41, p < .0001, η
2
p = .57, for the young, HCR, and LCR groups, respectively).
Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing the means of the three repetition conditions in
each group (Table 2) showed that in the LCR group, all the diﬀerences were
signiﬁcant (means: 0.23, 0.39, and 0.08 for non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs,
respectively), indicating that repeated pairs led to more FA on R judgments than
non-repeated pairs. However, for the HCR group, the diﬀerence between the non-
repeated and repeated conditions was not signiﬁcant (means: 0.11, 0.11, and 0.01 for
non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs, respectively), and the same thing occurred in
the young group (means: 0.04, 0.05, and 0.00, respectively), indicating in both groups
that repetition did not increase the FA rates on R judgments. In other words,
repetition increased FA on R judgments only in the LCR group, but not in the HCR
and young groups. These results show that HCR seems to decrease false recollection
(comparing HCR vs LCR groups). For some authors, false recollection could be
considered an early indicator of cognitive impairment (e.g., Hildebrandt et al., 2009;
McCabe et al., 2009).
Overall, the results found on R judgments mimic the results found on total “yes”
judgments, showing again that the LCR group discriminated worse through R judg-
ments than the HCR group because they committed more FA on R judgments (but the
same hits) than the HCR group. Moreover, the HCR group (as in young people) improved
its performance on R judgments through practice, whereas the LCR group did not.
Know judgments
With regard to discriminability data (d’) on know (K) judgments (Table 2), a mixed
ANOVA of 3 groups × 2 repetition conditions revealed that the main eﬀects and
interaction between the two variables were not signiﬁcant.
Regarding hits on K judgments, the mixed 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed that the main
eﬀects and interaction of the two variables were non-signiﬁcant. Some authors (Koen &
Yonelinas, 2014; Yonelinas, 2002) argue that K judgments are not good estimators of
true familiarity, proposing new methods to estimate it. For example, the independence
method (Koen & Yonelinas, 2014; Yonelinas, 2002) proposes the result yielded by the
formula (hits on K judgments)/(1 – hits on R judgments) as a good estimator of true
familiarity. Using it as dependent variable in a new ANOVA of 3 groups × 2 repetition
conditions, the results revealed that the main eﬀects and the interaction of the two
variables were again non-signiﬁcant. These results show that familiarity seems to be
stable throughout a healthy life cycle (e.g., Algarabel et al., 2009; Koen & Yonelinas, 2014;
Yonelinas, 2002).
Finally, regarding FA made on K judgments (Table 2), a mixed ANOVA of 3 groups × 3
repetition conditions (non-repeated, repeated, and new pairs) showed that the main
eﬀects of both variables were signiﬁcant, groups (F2, 117 = 9.51, p < .0001, η
2
p = .14) and
repetition conditions (F2, 234 = 33.90, p < .0001, η
2
p = .23). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests
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comparing the means of the three groups showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
mean of the young group (0.05) and the LCR and HCR groups (0.12 and 0.09, respec-
tively, with the diﬀerence not being signiﬁcant), indicating that young people use
familiarity better than elderly people to correctly reject new information. Post-hoc
Bonferroni t-tests comparing the means of the three repetition conditions showed
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the new pairs (mean: 0.03) and the non-repeated and
repeated pairs (means: 0.11 and 0.11, respectively, with the diﬀerence not being sig-
niﬁcant). However, the interaction between the two variables was not signiﬁcant, which,
in relation to the main objective of our study, means that the increase in total FA
produced by the repetitions in the LCR group (but not in the HCR or young groups) is
due to the incorrect use of recollection, and not familiarity, with implications that we
discuss later.
Discussion
In general, our results provide support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis by showing
that the HCR group performed signiﬁcantly better than the LCR group on the associative
recognition task. However, this diﬀerence is not due to a diﬀerent use of familiarity in
the HRC and LRC groups, as both samples use familiarity in a similar way in recognition
(as they get similar rates of hits, FA, and d’ on K judgments). The diﬀerence in the
performance of the HRC and LRC groups must lie in the diﬀerent ways the two samples
use recollection, both correctly (hits) and, especially, incorrectly (FA).
Regarding correct recognition based on R judgments, our data show that, although
there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the hit rates on R judgments between the HRC and
LRC samples, the HRC sample beneﬁts from the stimulus repetition in a similar way to
the young people. Both samples improve signiﬁcantly with practice, although, logically,
starting at diﬀerent basal levels. However, the LCR sample does not show any improve-
ment with stimulus repetition, suggesting that they can have an associative-binding
deﬁcit (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008).
Regarding FA based on R judgments (or “phantom” recollections), our data reveal
signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the three samples, showing that the false recognition
increases with age (e.g., Buchler et al., 2011; Kilb & Naveh-Benjamin, 2011; McCabe et al.,
2009) and, as a novel ﬁnding, that cognitive reserve seems to decrease false recollection
(comparing HCR vs LCR groups). Likewise, our data show that repetition increases false
recognition (e.g., Buchler et al., 2011; Gallo et al., 2004; Pitarque et al., 2015; Rhodes
et al., 2008). However, as an original contribution, we have shown that this increase in
false recognition produced by stimulus repetition is not due to an incorrect use of
familiarity, but rather due to an increase in false recollections that only occurs in the LCR
group, but not in the HCR group or in young people. Thus, this result would conﬁrm the
idea that young people and older people with HCR correctly use the recall-to-reject
mechanism to reduce false recollection on rearranged pairs (e.g., Gallo et al., 2004),
because they would be capable of rejecting a reordered pair by remembering that the
face presented in this pair was studied in association with another scenario (or by
remembering that the scenario presented was associated with another face).
In summary, our results show that the HCR group shows similar behavior to the group
of young people (even though they start from diﬀerent basal levels), which can be
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interpreted as an indicator of good cognitive functioning. However, and as a novelty, we
have shown that the LCR group shows signiﬁcantly higher rates of false recollection than
the other two groups (which could indicate early cognitive decline; Hildebrandt et al.,
2009; McCabe et al., 2009), and that their FA on R judgments increase with stimulus
repetition, showing that these subjects have an impaired ability to use recall to reduce
false recognition (e.g., Gallo et al., 2004). What seems to occur in the rearranged pairs is
that both young people and elderly HCR people (but not elderly LCR people) are able to
recollect the original associate of one of the items in order to reject the rearranged lures,
using repetition to improve this recall-to-reject monitoring strategy. However, elderly
LCR people show a monitoring deﬁcit and respond to rearranged pairs mainly based on
the high activation of each item, which is increased by repetition (Gallo et al., 2004).
However, we must be cautious in our conclusions about the role of cognitive reserve
because our samples may diﬀer on other variables apart from the cognitive reserve. For
example, in our data (older people, n = 80) cognitive reserve correlated signiﬁcantly with
FA on R judgments (made on non-repeated, repeated, and new stimuli, r = −.37, r = −.62,
and r = −.50, respectively, all p < .001), but it did not correlate with hits, which seem to
show the protective role of cognitive reserve on false recollections. The same pattern of
signiﬁcant correlations was found in the variables that were part of our deﬁnition of
cognitive reserve (see also Solé-Padullés et al., 2009): WAIS vocabulary, education level,
occupation level, and leisure activities. However, age also correlated with FA (made on
non-repeated and repeated pairs, r = .24 and r = .28, respectively, p < .05, although our
samples were matched on age), but not with hits. Finally, the Mini-Mental scores neither
correlated with hits nor with FAs on R judgments (probably neither the LCR nor the HCR
samples showed cognitive impairment). However, none of the former variables signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with either hits or FA on K judgments, which seems to suggest that
aging aﬀects recollection errors, but not familiarity (e.g., McCabe et al., 2009). Therefore,
our results can only be considered cumulative evidence for the cognitive reserve
hypothesis, in accordance with other publications (see, e.g., Angel et al., 2010; Gordon,
Soldan, Thomas, & Stern, 2013; Valenzuela & Sachdev, 2006).
Our results reinforce the idea that false recollection in the LCR group can be the result
of a decline in both binding (at encoding) and monitoring mechanisms on retrieval (e.g.,
Fandakova et al., 2013). When processing stimuli that share perceptual characteristics,
the LCR participants seem to ﬁrst encode the stimuli through weaker episodic traces
than young people, mistakenly combining features from studied events due to their
binding deﬁcits (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Second, their retrieval can produce
misrecollections or source monitoring errors, produced by their inability to use recall
to reduce false recognition (Abe et al., 2011; Gallo et al., 2004).
Our results seem to provide support for the dual-process recognition models (e.g.,
Yonelinas, 2002) in the sense that familiarity does not seem to be aﬀected by age, while
the recollection does. Our results could also be explained by other dual models related
to the false memories literature as, for example, by the activation/monitoring framework
(Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) which explains both true recognition and
false recognition in terms of two components: an automatic activation of the studied
words that spreads to non-studied related lures (which could lead the LCR group to
recollect a false association in a rearranged pair), and a recollection-based monitoring
process involving conscious decision-making (which could lead both young and HCR
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samples to reduce their false recognitions). Similarly, our results are consistent with the
familiarity plus corroboration or content-borrowing account (Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, &
Leding, 2005) which suggests that when an item lure is highly activated by the pre-
sentation of several related items (either perceptually or conceptually), the subject
searches for evidence that this item lure was presented, sometimes borrowing false
contextual details from the actual items.
In summary, our experiment shows that stimulus repetition increases recollection-type
false recognition, but only in older people with LCR, while it does not aﬀect young people
or older people with HCR (who are capable of correcting by using monitoring strategies to
counteract the eﬀect of the high activation, increased by repetition, of the items). Thus, our
results seem to provide support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis (Stern, 2009).
Note
1. As HCR and LCR groups diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their Mini-Mental scores (MMSE, but neither
group showed cognitive impairment; see Table 1), data were also analyzed by mixed
ANCOVA, taking the Mini-Mental scores as covariate. As the ANCOVA and ANOVA results
were similar, we only present the latter here.
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